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OYSTER MORTALITY DUE TO FRESHWATER
DIVERSIONS IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON
RESPONSE EFFORT: ARE TAKINGS CLAIMS
VIABLE?
Catherine M. Janasie*

Many private parties sustained damage after the Deepwater Horizon
incident on April 20, 2010 (the Spill). Since the Spill, many of these
parties have attempted to recover their losses, and the news recently has
been filled with stories detailing the settlement of some of these claims.1
After the Spill, British Petroleum (BP) set up the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility, which paid over $6 billion before it was replaced with a courtsupervised claims process in June 2012.2 The U.S. District Court in
Louisiana recently approved a settlement in the Spill’s multi-district
litigation.3 While there is a $2.3 billion cap on the claims that BP will
pay to seafood vessel owners, seafood boat crews and captains,
commercial fishermen, and oyster leaseholders, other claims are not

* Ocean and Coastal Law Fellow at the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal
Program, University of Mississippi School of Law; L.L.M., Lewis & Clark Law School;
J.D., Rutgers University School of Law. Research for this article was made possible by
funding for the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program under award number
NA10OAR4170078 from the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Consortium and the U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
The statements, findings, conclusions, and recommendations are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Commerce or NOAA.
1. See, e.g., Judge OKs Settlement in BP Class-Action Suit, CNN (Dec. 22, 2012, 1:50
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/22/us/bp-spill-settlement/index.html?iref=allsearch
[hereinafter Judge OKs Settlement]; Tom Fowler, Transocean Is Set to Pay $1.4 Billion in
Gulf Spill, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 3, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324374004578219533349270970.
2. Michael Kunzelman, BP Oil Spill Payments Exceed $1B Mark, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 10, 2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.bigstory.ap.org/article/bp-oil-spillsettlement-payments-exceed-1b-mark-0.
3. See id.
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capped.4 Through this settlement, BP estimates that it will pay out more
than $7.8 billion of the $20 billion trust to resolve all the claims.5
The U.S. government has also settled some of its civil and criminal
cases from the Spill.6 In November 2012, BP settled with the U.S.
Department of Justice to plead guilty to criminal charges and pay $4.5
billion in fines, one of largest criminal fines ever imposed by the U.S.
government against a corporation.7 In addition, BP faces additional
Clean Water Act claims that were not included in the settlement with the
Department of Justice.8 Transocean Ltd., who owned the rig that
exploded, recently settled with the U.S. Department of Justice to pay
$1.4 billion to cover all federal civil and criminal charges against the
company.9
Among those parties who sustained damage as a result of the Spill
are oystermen who raise and harvest oysters in the Gulf of Mexico
(Gulf).10 Oysters are in a unique position in the Gulf. In addition to
being an economic commodity, oysters are a keystone species and
provide ecosystem services such as filtering water.11 Unfortunately, the
Spill occurred when oysters were spawning, so the oyster population was
likely very damaged by the Spill.12 However, much of the oyster
mortality is being attributed to the decision to flush freshwater into the
Gulf as part of the response effort, and not due to oil from the Spill.13
The State of Louisiana decided to use its freshwater diversion system
in an attempt to keep oil out of the state’s coastal marshes and
wetlands.14 Louisiana and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began to
4. Judge OKs Settlement, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Clifford Krause & John Schwartz, BP Will Plead Guilty and Pay Over $4 Billion,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/business/global/16ihtbp16.html?pagewanted=all.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Fowler, supra note 1.
10. MIKE FREEMAN, STEPHEN GIDIERE & MARY SAMUELS, THE OIL SPILL’S IMPACT ON
GULF COAST OYSTERS 1 (2010), available at http://www.eli.org/pdf/na_4011/40.11097.pdf.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1-2.
13. Id. at 1. Throughout my research, I encountered “freshwater” spelled in two ways:
“freshwater” and “fresh water.” Except when I am quoting or referencing sources, I will
use the “freshwater” spelling.
14. Nicole Santa Cruz & P.J. Huffstutter, Effort to Keep Oil Spill at Bay Tips
Ecological Balance, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/
03/nation/la-na-freshwater-20100803.
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flush unprecedented amounts of freshwater into Louisiana’s coastal
waters beginning ten days after the Spill.15 Most parties concur that the
freshwater diversions lowered the salinity level in Louisiana’s coastal
marshes, and that the lower salinity levels led to massive amounts of
oyster mortality in these areas.16 However, disagreement exists as to the
effectiveness of the freshwater diversions.17 In addition, although most
parties acknowledge that the freshwater diversions attributed to a drop of
salinity that led to oyster mortality, some parties are claiming that the
freshwater diversions were only one of several factors that caused
salinity levels to drop in Louisiana’s coastal waters.18
Ironically, these diversion systems were planned and completed by
the state of Louisiana and the federal government partly at the request of
the oyster industry.19 The freshwater diversion systems were built as part
of an effort to protect and preserve Louisiana’s coastline and remain part
of Louisiana’s coastal restoration plan.20 Louisiana continues to use
freshwater diversions to prevent further coastal erosion and salt water
intrusion, as well as “to maintain and enhance the existing ecological
framework” of Louisiana’s coastal areas.21
This article will look at possible recovery available against Louisiana
and the federal government for oyster harvesters and distributors for
damage done to their leased oyster beds by the freshwater diversions
after the Spill. As stated above, oyster leaseholders had the option to
join the $2.3 billion settlement for the seafood industry in the multidistrict litigation.22 Similarly, oyster leaseholders could have submitted
claims to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility.23 However, this article will
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Jeffrey Ball, Fresh Water Aimed at Oil Kills Oysters, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2010, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704720004575377503611992306.html.
19. Chris Kirkham, Louisiana Oyster Industry Struggles to Cope with Oil Spill, Coastal
(Oct.
31,
2010,
9:00
AM),
Restoration
Efforts,
TIMES-PICAYUNE
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/10/louisiana_oyster_industry_stru.html.
20. COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY OF LOUISIANA, PROJECTS,
http://www.coastal.la.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&nid=78&pnid=0&pi
d=97&catid=0&elid=0 (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) [hereinafter PROJECTS].
21. COASTAL PROTECTION & RESTORATION AUTHORITY OF LOUISIANA, PROJECT
SUMMARY FOR THE DAVIS POND FRESHWATER DIVERSION, http://sonriswww.dnr.state.la.us/sundown/cart_prod/cart_ocpr_project_summary?pattask_proj_id=a2
b200bf7eb32e94e040007f01005d75&popen_in_attask=N&phide_merged_fields=N (last
visited Sept. 15, 2013) [hereinafter PROJECT SUMMARY DAVIS POND DIVERSION].
22. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
23. See id.
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look at the ability of oyster leaseholders in Louisiana to bring takings
claims under the U.S. and Louisiana constitutions.24
Part I will discuss the history of oysters and freshwater diversions in
Louisiana. Part II of this article will discuss the Deepwater Horizon
disaster and the freshwater diversions, including how the diversions
impacted oysters. Part III will briefly discuss the other forms of recovery
available to the oystermen. 25 Part IV will discuss the recovery under
state and federal law for takings claims. Part V will analyze whether
these takings claims could be successful.
I. HISTORY OF OYSTERS AND FRESHWATER DIVERSIONS IN LOUISIANA
Oysters play an integral role in the Gulf ecosystem.26 As a keystone
species, oysters have “a shaping, disproportionate influence on [their]
habitat and community.”27 In addition, oysters work to purify the water
in their habitat, as they can filter at least a gallon of water in an hour,28
and between twenty-five to fifty gallons in a day.29 Further, oyster reefs
serve as habitat and nursery grounds for other species in the ecosystem.30
Oyster reefs also keep down coastal erosion because the reefs form
ridges on the sea bottom, which minimize tidal impacts and waves.31
Finally, oysters serve as a food source for other species in the ecosystem,
including birds.32
In addition to their vital importance to the Gulf’s ecosystem, oysters
are also an extremely vital economic commodity.33 NOAA reported that
in 2008, Gulf fishermen harvested over one billion pounds of shellfish
and finfish that yielded $659 million in revenue.34 The Gulf is the
24. Additional claims may be available to oyster leaseholders under state or federal
law, but these claims are beyond the scope of this paper. Further, this paper will not
address the recovery available under the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, pursuant to the terms
of the Oil Pollution Act.
25. In this article, the term “oystermen” refers to men and women who make their
living producing and harvesting oysters in the Gulf.
26. NAT’L COMM’N ON BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEP WATER, THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 178
(2011) [hereinafter DEEP WATER REPORT].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Freeman, Gidiere & Samuels, supra note 10, at 1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 26, at 186-7.
34. Id. at 187.
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leading producer of the nation’s oysters, with NOAA reporting that
Louisiana itself accounts for sixty-seven percent of the country’s oyster
production.35 All in all, oysters produce around $131 million in annual
revenue for the Gulf Coast region.36 In addition to loss of revenue due to
physical harm and the seafood harvesting closures that occurred after the
Spill, many in the region are concerned with the lack of consumer
confidence in Gulf seafood after the Spill.37 Because of lower salinity
levels and oil from the Spill, oyster production from January to June
2010 was down fifty-seven percent compared to averages from 2007 to
2009, and the dockside value loss for the same time period was fortyfour percent.38
A. Oyster Leases in Louisiana
Under Louisiana law, oyster leases are recognizable property rights,
so that oyster leases have legal attributes similar to other real property
and are protectable against injuries by third parties.39 Under Louisiana
law, “[a] lessee shall enjoy the exclusive use of the water bottoms leased
and of all oysters and cultch grown or placed thereon.”40 However, the
statute goes on to state that an oyster lessee’s
exclusive use of water bottoms is subordinate to the rights or
responsibilities of the state, any political subdivision of the state,
the United States, or any agency or agent thereof, to take any
action in furtherance of coastal protection, conservation, or
restoration. For purposes of this Subpart, ‘coastal protection,
conservation, or restoration’ means any project, plan, act, or
activity for the protection, conservation, restoration,
enhancement, creation, preservation, nourishment, maintenance,
or management of the coast, coastal resources, coastal wetlands,
and barrier shorelines or islands, including but not limited to
projects authorized under any comprehensive coastal protection
master plan or annual coastal protection plan issued pursuant to

35. Id.
36. Freeman, Gidiere & Samuels, supra note 10, at 1.
37. DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 26, at 185.
38. Natalia Real, Louisiana Oyster Industry Struggling the Most, FISH INFO & SERVICE CO.
(Oct. 1, 2010, 3:30 PM), http://fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&
special=&monthyear=&day=&id=38392&ndb=1&df=0.
39. Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:423(A) (2006).
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Part II of Chapter 2 of Title 49 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes
of 1950.41
The statute allows an oyster lessee to make a claim for damage or injury
done to the oyster beds or grounds of the lease, but states once again that
the lessee may not bring an action “against the state, any political
subdivision of the state, the United States, or any agency, agent,
contractor, or employee thereof for any claim arising from any project,
plan, act, or activity in relation to coastal protection, conservation, or
restoration, except as provided in R.S. 56:427.1.”42
The State of Louisiana and any of its political subdivisions, along
with the United States, may not be held liable for coastal restoration
actions, including any claims arising from freshwater diversions “for the
purpose of coastal protection, conservation, or restoration.”43 In
addition, Louisiana law requires all oyster leases to contain “holdharmless” language to this effect.44
In addition to private oyster leases, Louisiana law also establishes
public oyster seed grounds for the oyster industry’s use and benefit.45 A
person may take mature oysters, seed oysters, or cultch from the public
seed grounds for their own use or benefit.46 However, to do so, the
person must obtain a permit from the state.47
B. History of Louisiana’s Diversion System and the Oyster Industry
Ironically, the diversion system that many believe caused oyster
mortality after the Spill was built in part because of requests by the
oyster industry.48 Historically, Louisiana’s coastal waters provided an
ideal habitat and salinity for oysters, since the freshwater from the
Mississippi River and other smaller streams mixed with the Gulf’s
saltwater.49 However, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)
expanded the levee system of the Mississippi after the flood of 1927 in

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:423(B) (2006).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:427.1(A) (2006).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:427.1(B) (2006).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56:434 (2006).
Id.
Id.
See Avenal v. Louisiana, 886 So.2d 1085, 1088 (La. 2004).
Id.

2013]

Oyster Mortality

35

an effort to prevent future major floods of the Mississippi River.50
However, by controlling the flooding of the Mississippi River with the
levee system, freshwater no longer reached these coastal areas, which
raised the salinity level in these waters.51 The increased salinity had two
effects: (1) areas landward that had previously had salinity levels that
were too low for oyster cultivation now could support oyster growth; and
(2) areas from the coast that had previously been ideal for oyster
cultivation were now too saline to support oyster growth.52 In addition,
the Mississippi River levee system led to coastal erosion and the loss of
wetlands along Louisiana’s coast.53
In the 1950s, the federal and state governments began to address
these effects and plan a diversion system to reintroduce the Mississippi
River’s freshwater back into the effected coastal waters.54 At the request
of local groups, which included the oyster industry, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (the FWS) began an investigation into the effects of the
Mississippi levee system.55 In 1959, the FWS issued a memorandum to
the Corps that stated that natural and man-made events had raised the
salinity in these coastal waters, which had an adverse effect on the fish
and wildlife of the area, including oysters.56 In the 1959 memorandum,
the FWS concluded that “[i]ntroduction of fresh water to reestablish
natural patterns of salinity . . . would provide the most effective method
of restoring fish and wildlife production.”57 In addition, the 1959
memorandum also recognized that the increased salinity had made some
waters that had previously been too fresh suitable for oyster growth.58
Finally, the 1959 memorandum identified four locations for diversion
sites, including in the areas that had previously been too fresh for oyster
cultivation.59
Through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Corps continued to work
with the Louisiana state government on planning the freshwater

50. Id. For a discussion of the history of the Mississippi River levee system and flood
control in the area, see KAREN M. O’NEILL, RIVERS BY DESIGN: STATE POWER AND THE
ORIGINS OF U.S. FLOOD CONTROL (2006).
51. Avenal, 886 So.2d at 1088.
52. Id. at 1088-89.
53. See id. at 1089.
54. Id. at 1088.
55. Id. at 1088-89.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1089.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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diversion system.60 In the 1970s, coastal erosion and increased salinity
levels continued in these areas, which continued to move the areas for
oyster growth further landward, while making previously vital oyster
grounds unusable, including Louisiana’s public seed grounds.61 The
Corps prepared an Environmental Impact Statement in 1984, proposing
the construction of three diversion structures to control salinity and
recognizing that “the zone where conditions will become too fresh for
oyster cultivation as a result of the diversion coincides with an area that
was historically (prior to 1960) too fresh and not favorable for oyster
cultivation.”62 Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s, the planned diversions
were constructed and became operational.63
The freshwater diversion system continues to be part of Louisiana’s
coastal restoration plan.64 Louisiana uses the freshwater diversion
system to slow the intrusion of saltwater and aid marsh growth in coastal
Louisiana in an effort “to maintain and enhance the existing ecological
framework” of Louisiana’s coastal areas by providing freshwater,
sediment, and nutrients.65
Louisiana has anticipated continued tension between its use of
freshwater diversions and its effect on the oyster industry.66 As
discussed above, in response to the operation of the freshwater diversion
system, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF)
inserted a clause into its oyster lease form that indemnifies and holds
harmless Louisiana for all claims related to the state’s coastal restoration
actions.67 Further, because Louisiana plans to continue using freshwater
diversions in its coastal restoration plans, Governor Jindal formed the
Oyster Advisory Committee, in part to address the oyster damage due to
the Spill and the freshwater diversions, and in part to address the
potential future conflicts between the oyster industry and freshwater
diversions initiated for coastal restoration purposes.68

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1089-90.
Id. at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1090-92.
PROJECTS, supra note 20.
PROJECT SUMMARY DAVIS POND DIVERSION, supra note 21.
Avenal, 886 So.2d at 1090.
Id.
Kirkham, supra note 19.
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II. THE OIL SPILL AND THE FRESHWATER DIVERSIONS
On April 20, 2010 an explosion on the drilling rig the Deepwater
Horizon, which was operating in the Gulf of Mexico (the Gulf) for BP,
caused one of history’s greatest oil spills.69 After eighty-six days of oil
gushing into the Gulf, BP finally claimed that it had capped the Macondo
well in July 2010.70 In September, five months after the Spill, pressure
tests determined that the pumping of cement into the well’s base formed
a final seal, and the federal government declared that the Macondo well
was dead.71
All in all, scientists for the government have estimated that around
five million barrels of oil gushed into the Gulf from the Macondo well.72
The oil reached the shores of Louisiana first, and tar balls and oil mousse
made it to the shores of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida by June.73
The Gulf is the home of an extremely rich and productive ecosystem, and
the Spill threatened to damage these resources.74 In the aftermath of the
Spill, the media inundated the American public with images of oilslicked waterways and oil-covered wildlife; however, very little coverage
was given to another negative consequence of the Spill response –
freshwater diversions from the Mississippi River into the bays of
Louisiana.75
A. The Freshwater Diversions
In an attempt to keep oil from the Spill from reaching the coast of
Louisiana, Louisiana and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began to
flush freshwater into Barataria Bay and Breton Sound.76 The freshwater
diversions began ten days after the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon
69. Campbell Robertson, U.S. Puts Oil Spill Total at Nearly 5 Million Barrels, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03flow.html.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 26, at 174.
75. See, e.g., 100 Days of the BP Spill: A Timeline, TIME, http://content.time.com/
time/interactive/0,31813,2006455,00.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (an interactive
timeline containing multiple images of the oil spill but no mention of damage from
freshwater diversions);
Huff Post: Gulf Oil Spill, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/bp-oil-spill/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (A
collection of stories covering the spill including many images of oil in the marshes but
containing no stories on the damage done by the freshwater diversions).
76. Santa Cruz & Huffstutter, supra note 14.
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rig, on April 30, 2010.77 According to a coastal scientist in Louisiana,
these diversions were a preferred response measure because they were a
low-cost solution that would not require any funds from either BP or the
federal government.78 The diversions were accomplished by releasing
large quantities of river water through gates along the Mississippi River
levees and man-made channels into Louisiana’s coastal marshes.79 The
freshwater was released through this system in larger quantities than had
been released by the system in the past.80
Louisiana opened the Davis Pond and Caernarvon diversions, the
state’s largest two diversions, on April 30, 2010.81 On May 4, 2010
Louisiana opened the Ostrica Locks to flush additional freshwater into
Breton Sound.82 On May 7, 2010, the Louisiana Office of Coastal
Protection and Restoration (OCPR) announced that six diversions with a
combined flow of 18,900 cubic feet along the lower Mississippi had been
opened in order to keep oil from getting to Louisiana’s wetlands and
estuaries.83 On May 10, 2010, OCPR announced that the Davis Pond
diversion had been opened to full capacity.84 On May 12, 2010, OCPR
announced that a seventh diversion had been opened, and the total
combined flow of these diversions was 29,550 cubic feet per second.85
The following are the seven diversions that were opened:

77. Id.
78. Id. The solution was low-cost because a freshwater diversion system already
existed in Louisiana, which will be discussed in Part III.
79. Jeffrey Ball, supra note 18.
80. Santa Cruz & Huffstutter, supra note 14.
81. See Press Release, State of Louisiana, Office of Coastal Protection and
Restoration Officials Open Additional Freshwater Diversions to Help Protect Coastal
Wetlands
from
Oil
Spill
(May
7,
2010),
available
at
http://emergency.louisiana.gov/Releases/05072010-cpra.html [hereinafter Press Release,
Additional Freshwater Diversions]. “The Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration is
the implementation office for the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority.” Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See Press Release, State of Louisiana, Office of Coastal Protection and
Restoration Officials Open Davis Pond Diversion to Full Capacity to Help Curb Oil
Penetration
into
Coastal
Marshes
(May
10,
2010),
available
at
http://emergency.louisiana.gov/Releases/05102010-ocpr.html [hereinafter Press Release,
Davis Pond Diversion].
85. See Press Release, State of Louisiana, State Opens Additional Freshwater
Diversion Canal at Bayou Lamoque in Plaquemines Parish (May 12, 2010), available at
http://emergency. louisiana.gov/Releases/05122010-Lamoque.html [hereinafter Press
Release, Plaquemines Parish].
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(1) Davis Pond Diversion: St. Charles Parish;
(2) Violet Siphon: St. Bernard Parish;
(3) Caernarvon Diversion: St. Bernard Parish;
(4) Whites Ditch Siphon: Plaquemines Parish;
(5) Naomi Siphon: Plaquemines Parish;
(6) West Pointe A la Hache Siphon: Plaquemines Parish; and
(7) Bayou Lamoque Diversion: Plaquemines Parish.86
The diversions, which are located on both the east and west sides of the
Mississippi River, diverted water into the northern Barataria Basin87 and
the adjacent wetlands to Breton Sound and Black Bay.88
Through these press releases, OCPR made it clear that it thought
opening these diversions was necessary to protect Louisiana’s coastal
resources. OCPR Assistant Director Jerome Zeringue stated, "[w]e have
opened every diversion structure we control on the state and parish level
to try to limit the oil approaching our coasts."89 Robert Barham,
Secretary of the LDWF, stated that "[t]he potential effects of this oil spill
could last for decades, so we are using every means at our disposal to try
to lessen the devastation the oil could inflict on our wetlands."90 Garret
Graves, Chairman of the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority, stated:
Oil has made its way west of the Mississippi River and we
are using every tool we have available to try and protect our
coastal resources. We have been using diversions, siphons
and locks on both the east and west side for more than 10
days to try and push the oil away from our coastal wetlands.
The Barataria Basin is a maze of marshy islands, grass beds,
bayous, ponds and lakes. It will be nearly impossible for us
to clean the oil out of these areas for years if it gets in
there.91

86. Id. In addition to these seven diversions, Louisiana also flushed freshwater
through Ostrica Locks.
87. See Press Release, Davis Pond Diversion, supra note 84.
88. See Press Release, Plaquemines Parish, supra note 85. Four of the diversions are
in Plaquemines Parish, three are located in St. Bernard Parish, and one is located in St.
Charles Parish. Id.
89. Press Release, Additional Freshwater Diversions, supra note 81.
90. Press Release, Plaquemines Parish, supra note 85.
91. Id.
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In addition, the OCPR stated that they would “continue to closely
monitor coastal conditions and will assess any potential damage to
wetlands as impacts are reported.”92
B. The Effect on Oysters
Parties are in disagreement as to the effectiveness of the freshwater
flushing. The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil
Spill and Offshore Drilling stated in its report to President Obama (the
Presidential Report) that many parties believe that the diversions were “a
futile attempt to keep oil from entering the estuarine areas.”93 However,
other sources state that most accounts claim that the diversions were
successful in allowing only a minimal amount of oil into Louisiana’s
estuaries.94
Despite the disagreement concerning the diversions’
effectiveness, the freshwater diversions appear to be another response
effort that could result in its own environmental damage.95
Many scientists believe that the diversions are the cause of massive
oyster mortality in Louisiana’s marshes, because the flushing of
freshwater into these areas reduced the salinity of the water in the
marshes.96 Seawater usually has a salinity of about “[thirty-five] parts
salt per thousand parts water.”97 However, many of the most productive
waters for oysters in Louisiana have a salinity of about fifteen parts salt
per thousand parts water.98 In fact, oysters usually require a salinity level
between five to fifteen parts per thousand.99 Although oysters can
survive a fluctuation in salinity, they cannot do so for an extended period
of time.100 When salinity levels drop below five parts per thousand, the
salt level is too low for the survival of larvae and adult oysters and for
young oysters to attach to the oysters beds.101 After the diversions were
started, Earl Melancon, a biologist at Nicholls State University located in
Thibodaux, Louisiana, has said that the salinity levels in some areas of
92. Press Release, Additional Freshwater Diversions, supra note 86.
93. DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 27, at 178.
94. Ball, supra note 18.
95. Id. Other response efforts that could have adverse environmental impacts include
the use of dispersants and the building of sand berms off the Louisiana coast, which some
believe could actually increase coastal erosion. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Santa Cruz & Huffstutter, supra note 14.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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Barataria Bay were below five parts per thousand, a salinity level that
oysters would have difficulty surviving.102
Once the freshwater diversions had begun, scientists and oystermen
observed large numbers of empty, flapping oyster shells in Louisiana’s
oyster grounds, which meant that the oysters inside were dead.103
Further, these parties have observed large amounts of oyster mortality in
parts of Louisiana where oil from the Spill never reached, leading many
to believe that the deaths were caused by the freshwater diversions.104
Patrick Banks, who oversees the oyster fishery in Louisiana as a biologist
for LDWF, said LDWF conducted tests in an extremely productive part
of Barataria Bay and found that around sixty percent of the oysters in the
area had died.105 Banks also described an oyster die-off as looking “like
a fish kill” with oyster meat floating on the water’s surface in such large
quantities “that the predators that normally would eat up the oyster meat
just couldn’t keep up.”106 Melancon also found dead oysters in Barataria
Bay, and stated that dead oysters had also been found in Breton Sound.107
Melancon has claimed that he is “fairly confident” that the
freshwater diversions caused the oyster deaths that he observed.108 The
Presidential Report stated that “[o]yster mortality observed in the highly
productive areas of Barataria Bay and Breton Sound . . . appear to be
due, in large part, to the flood of fresh water introduced through river
diversions . . . .”109 A Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority spokesman has claimed that it is “obvious” that the diversions
resulted in a reduced salinity level in some of the state’s oyster beds;
however, the spokesman also claimed that the diversions were just one of
the factors that could have contributed to the lower salinity levels, as
other factors such as rain and the river’s natural flow could also have
been contributors.110 After the diversions, a BP spokesman refused to
comment on whether they would pay for oyster deaths caused by the
freshwater diversions.111

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Ball, supra note 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Santa Cruz & Huffstutter, supra note 14.
Id.
DEEP WATER REPORT, supra note 26, at 178.
Ball, supra note 18.
Id.
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John W. Tunnell, Jr. prepared an expert report on the expected
recovery of the seafood industry in the Gulf.112 In his opinion, Tunnell
discusses oysters in the Gulf and the impact of the Spill on oysters.113
Tunnell states that “[t]oo much freshwater will kill oysters, although they
can tolerate some freshwater flooding from time to time.”114 However,
Tunnell also states that oyster reefs can quickly recolonize due to the
large number of eggs and larvae produced by a single spawn.115 In
conclusion, Tunnell claims that oyster harvesting in 2011 in the northern
Gulf will follow the trends of recent years.116 Further, Tunnell states that
unless there are “large scale flooding events in 2011,” oyster reefs that
were damaged by freshwater diversions “should be recolonized by young
oysters in 2011 . . . but they will not likely be of harvestable size until
late 2012 or 2013.”117
III. ALTERNATIVE RECOVERY OPTIONS
Those who suffered damage due to the Spill faced several choices in
how they would like to recover their losses. Many claims for damages
have been processed by the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), which
paid out over $6 billion on more than 220,000 claims following the Spill
before being replaced by a court-supervised claims process in June
2012.118 The GCCF was set up pursuant to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA).119 Under OPA, a responsible party who discharges oil from a
vessel or facility is liable for the removal costs and damages that result
from the discharge.120 The responsible party is liable for, among other
costs, damages in connection with real or personal property, lost revenue
112. JOHN W. TUNNELL, JR., AN EXPERT OPINION OF WHEN THE GULF OF MEXICO WILL
RETURN TO PRE-SPILL HARVEST STATUS FOLLOWING THE BP DEEPWATER HOIZON MC 252
OIL SPILL (2011), available at http://media.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/other/TunnellGCCF-Final-Report.pdf.
113. Id. at 29.
114. Id. at 30.
115. Id. at 30-31. In addition, Tunnell points out that although oysters can be “tolerant
of light to medium oiling,” without detailed oiling maps, it is difficult to determine the
exact amount of oiling that oysters received in specific areas. Id.
116. Id. at 32.
117. Id. at 32-33. Tunnell states that oyster reefs that were heavily oiled might “not
recover for 6-8, even 10 years.” Id.
118. Kunzelman, supra note 2.
119. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, PROTOCOL FOR EMERGENCY ADVANCE PAYMENTS
(2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/library/
assets/gccf-emergency-advance-payments.pdf.
120. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a) (2006).
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and profits, and hindered earning capacity.121 Under OPA, all claims for
costs or damages must first be presented to the responsible party.122
After presenting a claim to the responsible party, if the claimant
disagrees with the responsible party’s denial of the claim or
determination of the amount owed, the claimant may present a claim to
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, administered by the National Pollution
Funds Center.123 This action is also available if the responsible party has
failed to act within ninety days after the claimant presented the claim.124
After the Spill, the U.S. Coast Guard designated BP as a responsible
party under OPA.125 BP, as required by OPA, set up a procedure for
paying and settling claims for damages and costs incurred because of the
Spill.126 However, the White House announced on June 16, 2010 that BP
would replace the claims process with the GCCF and establish a $20
billion escrow fund to pay for claims under OPA.127 The GCCF
reviewed individuals’ and businesses’ claims for damages and costs
incurred due to the Spill.128 Under the GCCF, an individual or business
could make a claim for Emergency Advance Payments, Quick Payment
Final Payments, Full Review Final Payments, or Interim Payments.129
Oystermen who sustained damage due to the freshwater diversions
after the Spill could make a Final Claim to the GCCF because the Final
Rules Governing Payment Options, Eligibility and Substantiation
Criteria, and Final Payment Methodology (Final Rules), specifically
mentioned damage caused by the freshwater diversions.130 The Final
121. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b) (2006).
122. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2713(a) (2006).
123. See U.S. COAST GUARD, NAT’L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR., THE OIL SPILL LIABILITY
TRUST FUND (OSLTF), http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/About_NPFC/osltf.asp (last visited Oct.
12, 2013).
124. Id.
125. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL:
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISKS AND COST REIMBURSEMENT AND
NOTIFICATION POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, REP. GAO-11-90R, 1 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-90R.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See Brian J. Donovan, Third Lawsuit Alleges Gross Negligence and Fraud by BP
Oil Spill Fund Administrator, DAILY KOS (July 19, 2013, 6:13 AM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2013/07/19/1224910/-Third-Lawsuit-Alleges-GrossNegligence-and-Fraud-by-BP-Oil-Spill-Fund-Administrator.
130. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, FINAL RULES GOVERNING PAYMENT OPTIONS,
ELIGIBILITY AND SUBSTANTIATION CRITERIA, AND FINAL PAYMENT METHODOLOGY 5 (Feb.
18, 2011), available at http://eng2viet.files.wordpress.com/2011/02/gccf-final-rules.pdf
[hereinafter FINAL RULES].
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Rules stated that claimants who had losses due to the freshwater
diversions were entitled to a Final Payment “equal to four times the
actual documented losses in 2010.”131 However, oystermen who
sustained this type of damage may have felt that they would be
inadequately compensated by the GCCF; many oystermen were confused
by the GCCF process and were unsure of how to calculate their losses.132
Further, though the Final Rules mention damage caused by freshwater
diversions, the claimants who sustained this type of damage may not
have been able to adequately document their claim to the GCCF.133
Claimants who had inadequate documentation had the option of
receiving a “Quick Payment,” which required no additional
documentation, as long as they had previously received an Interim
Payment or an Emergency Advance Payment.134
To receive most payments under the GCCF, claimants had to sign a
waiver.135 To receive a Quick Payment Final Claim, claimants had to
release and waive any future claims against BP and any other potentially
responsible party in connection to the Spill “or to submit any claim for
payment to the National Pollution Funds Center, the Coast Guard office
responsible for evaluating and approving Oil Pollution Act claims, or in
court.”136 Similarly, to receive a Final Payment from the GCCF, the
claimant had “to sign a release precluding the claimant from seeking
further compensation from the GCCF, the Coast Guard, or in court from
either BP or any other defendant company allegedly responsible for the
Oil Spill.”137 Since Interim Payments only covered documented past

131. Id.
132. Nikki Buskey, Oysterman Say Oil-Spill Claims Process Unclear, HOUMATODAY
(Nov. 7, 2010, 6:01 AM), http://www.houmatoday.com/article/20101107/ARTICLES/
101109419/ 0/SEARCH.
133. Because the oystermen “are located in the immediate vicinity of the Gulf shore . . .
the submission of adequate financial information and data contrasting wages and income
before and after the Oil Spill will usually be deemed sufficient to document a claim.”
FINAL RULES, supra note 130, at 7 (emphasis in original). In the same paragraph
however, the Final Rules also state that most of the claims received by the GCCF “are
pervasively lacking documentation contrasting pre- and post-Oil Spill wages and income
and complete 2010 financial documentation.” Id. (emphasis in original). Therefore,
oystermen may not have been able to substantiate their economic losses in a manner
sufficient to be able to collect under the GCCF.
134. Id. at 8. Quick Payments were in the amount of $5,000 for individuals and
$25,000 for businesses. Id.
135. See id. at 2, 8.
136. See id. at 1-2, 8.
137. Id. at 2.

2013]

Oyster Mortality

45

damages, a claimant was not required to sign a release and thus retained
all of his or her litigation rights.138
Under the Final Rules, it does not appear that oystermen had to
choose between either making a claim to the GCCF or pursuing a takings
claim in court.139 Although to collect most claims under the GCCF
claimants had to give up a lot of their future litigation rights by signing a
broad release, the releases did not cover claims against the state or
federal government.140 The Final Rules only mentioned a release that
would preclude claimants from seeking additional “compensation from
the GCCF, the Coast Guard, or in court from either BP or any other
defendant companies allegedly responsible for the Oil Spill.”141 Because
the State of Louisiana and the United States are not mentioned among the
parties released, oystermen who collected under the GCCF could still
pursue a takings claim against the United States and Louisiana.142
If an oysterman either disagreed with the GCCF’s denial of his or her
claim or the GCCF’s determination of the amount payable to the
claimant, or if the GCCF failed to act within ninety days after the
oysterman presented the claim, then the claimant could submit the claim
to the National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC).143 Unlike the GCCF, the
NPFC will not pay any amount for future or speculative damages, and
the NPFC requires a claimant to release “all rights to recover the amount
paid on that claim from responsible parties and from any person under
any other law consistent with provisions of OPA.”144 However, a
claimant does not have to release his or her rights to any claim for
damages or removal costs that are not included in the NPFC’s payment
to the claimant.145 Further, a claimant must bring a claim for damages

138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 9. Claims to the NPFC must be made in writing, for a “sum certain” for
damages and the cost of oil removal. U.S. COAST GUARD, NAT’L POLLUTION FUNDS CTR.,
DEEPWATER HORIZON CLAIMANT FAQS, http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/claims/DWH_faqs.asp
(last modified Sept. 12, 2013). Because the NPFC will only pay documented claims, a
claimant should include the documentation and information on which the claimant relied
in determining his or her “sum certain,” as well as all information proving that the costs
and damages were the result of the Spill. Id. Like the GCCF, the NPFC will most likely
deny any claim that is undocumented or submitted without supporting information. See
Id.
144. FINAL RULES, supra note 130, at 9.
145. Id.
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within three years after the injury and the connection to the Spill are
“reasonably discoverable with the exercise of due care.”146
Similarly, the oystermen could bring a claim for damages against BP
in court. 147 For example, the oystermen could join the multidistrict
litigation pending in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana.148 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
has approved a settlement for spill-related claims in the above
multidistrict litigation.149 The court set a deadline of January 22, 2013
for claimants to join the settlement for seafood claims.150 Recently the
U.S. District Court judge overseeing the litigation denied a motion to
extend the deadline to join the seafood settlement.151 Although the rest
of the settlement does not have a cap, the seafood claims, which cover
seafood vessel owners, seafood boat crews and captains, commercial
fishermen and oyster leaseholders, are capped at $2.3 billion.152 Overall,
the settlement process in this litigation has led to BP paying more than
$1 billion for claims, and BP estimates that the amount will reach around
$7.8 billion once the process is complete.153
IV. TAKINGS CLAIMS
Both the Federal Court of Claims and the Louisiana Supreme Court
have decided cases that addressed oyster mortality due to the freshwater
diversion systems in Louisiana.154 A background of takings law and

146. Id. A claimant must bring a claim for damage to natural resources within three
years after the natural resource damage assessment is completed under federal
regulations. Id. A claimant must bring a claim for removal costs within six years of the
completion of the claimant’s removal actions. Id.
147. Id. The NPFC procedures discussed in this paragraph do not apply to claims for
physical injury. Further, like claims to the NPFC, a court might not determine that the
claimant is entitled to more damages that the GCCF offers, and if the claimant is unable
to document a claim to the GCCF, it is unlikely that the claimant will be able to establish
a claim in court.
148. See generally In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891
(E.D. La. 2012).
149. Id. at 964; see also Kunzelman, supra note 2.
150. Kunzelman, supra note 2.
151. Richard Thompson, Federal Judge Rejects Motion to Extend Deadline for BP Oil Spill
Seafood Settlement, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 24, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/
gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2013/01/federal_judge_rejects_motion_t.html.
152. Judge OKs Settlement, supra note 1.
153. Kunzelman, supra note 2.
154. See, e.g., Avenal v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 778 (1995); see also, e.g., Avenal v.
Louisiana, 886 So. 2d 1085 (La. 2004).
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federal and state cases that addressed oyster mortality due to freshwater
diversions are discussed in turn below.
A. Takings Generally
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”155 The first part of the Fifth Amendment is known as the
Due Process Clause.156 The second part constrains the government’s use
of its power of eminent domain and is known as the Takings Clause.157
Eminent domain is an inherent government power to take privately
owned property for a public use without the owner’s consent, subject to
constitutional and statutory limitations.158 Because it is an inherent
power, the power of eminent domain does not need to be granted to the
government by statutes or the Constitution; therefore, the U.S.
Constitution does not grant to the federal government the power of
eminent domain.159
Rather, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution provides protection to property owners by stating that the
government can only take privately owned property without the property
owner’s consent if: (1) the government is taking the property for a public
purpose, and (2) the government pays just compensation to the property
owner.160 Therefore, the only time that a taking will be considered
unconstitutional is if the taking is not for a public use, even if
compensation is provided, or if the compensation provided is not
adequate.161
The purpose of this takings clause in the Fifth Amendment is to keep
the government from placing an unfair burden on private property

155. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
156. See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 556-57 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We
need not face these difficulties, however, for there is no need to torture the Takings
Clause to fit this case. The question involved -- the potential unfairness of retroactive
liability -- finds a natural home in the Due Process Clause, a Fifth Amendment
neighbor.”).
157. Id.
158. See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 244-45, 252
(1897).
159. See id.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005); see also, e.g.,
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318319 (1987) (discussing the just compensation clause).
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owners when the public should be bearing the burden.162 There are two
types of takings.163 The first category is physical takings, which is where
the government either obtains title to the property, known as
condemnation, or physically invades private property without providing
just compensation to the owner, known as inverse condemnation.164
However, the Fifth Amendment does not simply protect property owners
from the government invading, occupying, or removing property.165
Rather, it also protects against government regulatory action that
diminishes the usefulness of private property, which is known as a
regulatory taking.166 A regulatory taking occurs when the government
burdens private property with a regulation to such an extent that the
regulation has the same effect on the property as if the government had
physically taken the property.167 Put simply, if the regulation goes “too
far,” it will constitute a taking.168
Although a regulation can amount to a taking, states and local
governments have broad legislative power to regulate land use through
the police power, which allows a state to enact regulations to protect the
health, safety, and general welfare of the community.169 In addition to
the police power, the government may also act to protect the state’s
interest in submerged and public trust lands.170
By exercising these powers, the government may create conflicts
with property owners who might challenge the regulation.171 Under the
police power, a court will presume that a land use regulation is valid and
will only declare a regulation to be unconstitutional if it is clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, with no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, or welfare of the community.172 Further, as stated above,
if a land use regulation "goes too far," a court may consider it to be a
regulatory taking.173

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 558 (2001).
See id.
See id.
26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 11 (2013).
See id.
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
See e.g. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
See 26 AM. JUR., supra note 163, at § 11.
Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
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Courts have been unwilling to set hard and fast rules regarding
whether a property restriction by the government constitutes a taking.174
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has created certain categories of cases
that are considered per se takings.175 First, if the government physically
invades a person’s property on a permanent basis, the government has
taken the property and must provide just compensation to the property
owner.176 Second, if the government action keeps the owner from using
his or her property in any economically beneficial way, the government
has taken the property with what is known as a “total regulatory
taking.”177
Outside of these two per se regulatory takings, the U.S. Supreme
Court has also developed an analysis for land-use exactions, which
involve situations when the government seeks to impose a condition on
the property owner in exchange for authorizing a land use that it has
restricted otherwise.178 The Court laid out the test for whether an
exaction amounts to a taking in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission179 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.180 In Nollan, the Court
created what is known as the “essential nexus” test, which requires a
condition in the permit to serve “the same governmental purpose as the
development ban.”181 In Dolan, the Court added to the “essential nexus”
test by requiring a “rough proportionality” between the proposed
development’s impact and the condition.182 The lower courts have split
on whether the Nollan and Dolan tests should be applied to situations
outside of the facts of those cases, such as cases where the exaction does
not involve dedications of real property or in cases when a permit is
never issued, but the Supreme Court ruled during its 2013 term that
Nollan and Dolan could be applied to these situations.183
If a government action limits the use of property and does not fall
within one of the above categories, a court will apply the three-part test
174. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
175. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982).
176. See id.
177. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026, 1030 (1992).
178. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So.3d 1220, 1223 (2011)
(defining “exaction”), rev’d, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct.
2586, 2603 (2013); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987); Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1994).
179. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
180. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
181. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
182. Dolan, 512 U.S..at 390-91.
183. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013).
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established by the United States Supreme Court in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,184 known as the “Penn Central
Test.”185 Under the Penn Central Test, a court will analyze “the
character of the governmental action.”186 For example, a court might
look at whether the government has physically invaded the property or
otherwise impacted the property.187 A court will also examine “the
economic impact on the claimant.”188 Importantly, a court will analyze
“the extent to which the governmental action had interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations.”189 However, the Penn Central Test is
not a set formula and the Court intended for the test to be used by courts
as guidance in their analysis of whether there is a taking due to a
government’s restriction on the use of property.190
B. Federal Claims
As discussed in Part I.A above, oyster leases are recognized property
rights in Louisiana that are protectable from injury or damage done by
third parties.191 Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, state-created property
rights are protected from uncompensated takings by the state or federal
government.192 In Avenal v. United States,193 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit determined whether damage done to oyster beds
due to freshwater diversions, which were initiated to combat coastal
erosion and changed salinity levels at the Caernarvon diversion project,
constituted a taking by the government.194
The court first established that the intent of the government in its
development of the Caernarvon project was not to occupy or use the
plaintiffs’ oyster lease beds for government purposes but, rather, to limit
the plaintiffs’ use of the oyster beds.195 Further, the court concluded that
184. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
185. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Taking
Jurisprudence, 14 YALE L.J. 203, 243-51 (2004).
186. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
187. See, e.g., St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So.3d 1220, 1226-27
(2011).
188. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
189. Id.
190. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
326-27 (2002).
191. See Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 935-36.
195. Id. at 937.
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the limits imposed by the government substantially reduced the
plaintiffs’ property values.196
In the case, the court examined the oystermen’s claims using the
Penn Central test.197 In determining that there was no taking by the
government, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have
“reasonable investment-backed expectations” that their property interests
in their oyster lease beds would be protected from the state and federal
governments’ planned diversions of freshwater.198 An issue for the court
in determining that the plaintiffs did not have investment-backed
expectations was that the plaintiffs had not established how long they
had held their oyster leases.199 This led the court to assume that none of
the plaintiffs held leases prior to 1976, which the court calculated by
subtracting fifteen years, which is the term of oyster leases in Louisiana,
from 1991, the date when the government began operating the freshwater
diversions at the Caernarvon project.200 Because the state and federal
governments had been planning the freshwater diversion projects since
the 1950s and 1960s, the court ruled that the plaintiffs could not have
reasonable investment-backed expectations to be protected from the state
and federal governments’ planned freshwater diversions, because the
diversions were planned prior to when the plaintiffs were assumed to
have entered their leases.201 The court stated that the “plaintiffs as a
matter of law must be assumed to have known that their rights to use
bottom-lands for oystering were subject to the inevitable changes that the
anticipated government program would bring about.”202
Another factor in the court’s decision was the fact that plaintiffs’
oyster leases were in an area that was previously unsuitable for oyster
cultivation.203 The court stated that the plaintiffs were entitled to take
advantage of the changing salinity levels caused, at least partly, by
government actions in building the Mississippi levee system, for their
economic benefit by obtaining leases in these areas.204 However, the
196. Id. at 937 (quoting Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“There can be no doubt from the record that the limit on plaintiff’s use .
. . had the effect of substantially reducing the value of plaintiff’s property, well beyond
the level of ‘mere diminution.’”).
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 936-37.
200. Id. at 936.
201. Id. at 937-38.
202. Id. at 938.
203. See id. at 937.
204. Id.
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court further elaborated that the plaintiffs could not be surprised that the
government would again tamper with the area’s salinity levels.205
Finally, the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs possessed valuable
state-created property rights that were entitled to constitutional
protection, such as protection from unlawful pollution.206 Interestingly,
in dictum, the court also claimed that the hold-harmless clauses in some
of the plaintiffs’ oyster leases did not change the fact that the state and
federal governments’ actions had restrained the plaintiffs’ use of their
property.207 However, as discussed above, the court ruled that this
restraint did not amount to an unconstitutional taking.208
C. Louisiana Claims
Since the Louisiana Constitution distinguishes between property that
is “taken” and property that is “damaged,” what is considered a taking
under the Louisiana Constitution is narrower than what is considered a
taking under the U.S. Constitution.209 Under the Louisiana Constitution
[e]very person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy,
protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to
reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of
the police power. . . . Property shall not be taken or damaged by
the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes
and with just compensation.210
Moreover, a claimant must bring a takings claim within three years under
the statutory law of Louisiana, but a claimant must bring a damages
claim within two years under Article I, Section 4 of the Louisiana
Constitution.211
In Avenal v. State, the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled on the
plaintiffs’ claims under the Louisiana Constitution.212 The court applied
a three-part test to analyze “whether a claimant is entitled to eminent
domain compensation.”213 Under the three-part test, a court shall: “(1)
determine if a recognized species of property right has been affected; (2)
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 937-38.
Id.
Avenal v. State, 886 So.2d 1085, 1113-14 (La. 2004) (Weimer, J., concurring).
LA. CONST. art. I, §4.
Avenal, 886 So.2d at 1113-14 (Weimer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1088.
Id. at 1104 (citing State v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So.2d 598, 602-03 (La. 1992)).
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if it is determined that property is involved, decide whether the property
has been taken or damaged in a constitutional sense; and (3) determine
whether the taking or damaging is for a public purpose under Article I, §
4.”214
However, the Supreme Court of Louisiana determined the three-part
test was not necessary because the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred.215
As takings and damages claims have different prescription periods under
Article I, Section 4, the court stated that it was necessary to determine
whether the plaintiffs’ claims were takings or damages claims.216 The
plaintiffs’ claims were for damages, which are subject to a two-year
prescription period, because the property suffered a diminution in
property value due to government action.217
In Louisiana, the
prescription period for damages claims starts “to run after the completion
and acceptance of the public works.”218 As a result, the court ruled that
the prescription period began to run when the Caernarvon project became
operational in 1991, which effectively time-barred the plaintiffs’
claims.219
Regardless of the prescription period, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana also ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation
for a majority of their claims because the leases contained hold-harmless
clauses that released Louisiana from damage caused by coastal diversion
projects.220 This rationale differed from the federal court’s dictum that
the hold-harmless clauses did not change that the government had
restrained the plaintiffs’ use of the property.221 In holding that the hold214. Id.
215. Id. at 1104-05.
216. Id. at 1104.
217. Id. at 1105-06. Under Louisiana law, “property is ‘taken’ when the public
authority acquires the right of ownership or one of its recognized dismemberments.” Id.
at 1106 (quoting Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Hoyt, 215 So.2d 114, 120 (La.
1968)).
218. Id. (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5624 (2012)).
219. Id. at 1109.
220. Id. at 1098. The Court discussed how the Louisiana Department of Natural
Resources objected to the issuance of new oyster leases in areas of Louisiana that would
be affected by coastal restoration projects. Id. at 1096. But due to a compromise with the
Louisiana Coastal Restoration Policy Committee, oyster leases were allowed to be issued
with a hold-harmless and indemnity clause that favored Louisiana. Id. In that case, prior
to this requirement, Louisiana had issued twelve oyster leases that did not contain the
hold-harmless and indemnity language. Id. at 1102. The court ruled, however, that the
claims by the leaseholders whose leases did not contain the hold-harmless language were
still time-barred. Id. at 1109-10.
221. Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 938-39 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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harmless clauses were valid, the court stated the clauses were necessary
to the oyster industry’s development.222 Moreover, the court reasoned
the clauses were allowed under the public trust doctrine, which required
the state to protect Louisiana’s coastline.223 The public trust doctrine,
furthermore, required Louisiana to go forward with its coastal restoration
projects, including the planned freshwater diversions and “the
redistribution of existing productive oyster beds to other areas . . . in
[pursuit] of this goal.”224
V. RECOVERY UNDER TAKINGS CLAIMS
In order to succeed in a takings claim, the oystermen who suffered
damage due to freshwater diversions after the Spill will have to
distinguish their cases from the Avenal decisions in state and federal
court. As will be discussed below, the facts surrounding these freshwater
diversions are distinguishable from the Avenal decisions. However, even
though the facts are distinguishable, the oystermen will still have to
overcome some obstacles to succeed on a takings claim.
First, the oystermen may be able to distinguish their claims from the
facts underlying the Avenal decisions and make a better case that they
had reasonable investment-backed expectations. The court considered
deliberate diversions in the Avenal decisions, whereas the freshwater
diversions after the Spill were not the planned, as the freshwater
diversions began only ten days after the Spill and were not part of the
general coastal restoration plans of Louisiana.225 Further, the freshwater

222. Avenal, 886 So.2d at 1100. The court gave several reasons why the hold-harmless
clauses were necessary to the oyster industry’s development, including: (1) the clauses
allowed oyster lessees to risk that their leased grounds would be productive in the face of
the planned freshwater diversions; (2) the clauses allowed the coastal restoration projects
to continue without the danger of lawsuits; (3) the coastal restoration projects helped the
public seed-grounds’ productivity; and (4) the coastal restoration projects reestablished
the productive areas for oyster growth that existed prior to the Mississippi River levee
system. Id.
223. Id. at 1101.
224. Id. at 1102. The court also distinguished the facts of this case from the facts of a
prior case of the Supreme Court of Louisiana that prohibited the LDWF from
conditioning the renewal of existing oyster leases upon the inclusion of a “navigation and
oil field activity clause” to the lease because the clause was neither “necessary and
proper” to the development of the oyster industry, nor mandated by the public trust
doctrine. Id. at 1098-1103 (citing Jurisch v. Jenkins, 749 So.2d 597, 605-06 (La. 1999)).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
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diversion systems were put on full blast after the Spill, which had never
happened before in the history of the systems.226
In addition, the oystermen had been raising and cultivating oysters
for many years in these areas, even though the coastal restoration
freshwater diversions had been operational since the early 1990s.227
Moreover, if the oystermen who sustained damage are able to show how
long they have held their oyster leases, they will be able to distinguish
the facts of their situation from the facts in the Avenal decisions.
However, even if the facts are distinguishable from the facts in the
Avenal decisions, there are still roadblocks to the oystermen’s recovery
under takings claims.
A. State Claims
Although the freshwater diversions were not deliberate diversions,
like those in the Avenal decisions, the hold-harmless clauses that barred
most of the claims in the Avenal state decision may still apply. The holdharmless clauses that are included in oyster leases under Louisiana law
hold harmless state and federal actors from actions taken “in furtherance
of coastal protection, conservation, or restoration,” which include acts to
protect the state’s coastline, wetlands, and coastal resources.228 The
Louisiana OCPR’s press releases announcing the opening of the
freshwater diversion systems after the Spill stated the diversions were
used to protect the state’s coastal resources.229 In addition, the LDWF
stated that the diversions were an effort to keep oil from damaging
Louisiana’s wetlands.230 Thus, there is evidence that Louisiana and the
Corps acted within the terms of the hold-harmless clause currently found
in all Louisiana oyster leases.
Moreover, even though state statutory law provides that the holdharmless clause covers state and federal actions taken pursuant to “any
comprehensive coastal protection master plan or annual coastal
protection plan,” the state statutes also indicate the actions covered by
the hold-harmless clause are not limited to actions taken under these
plans.231 Therefore, the fact that these diversions were not taken
226. See Mark Schleifstein, BP Says It’s Not Responsible for Paying to Reseed Oyster
Beds, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 16, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oilspill/index.ssf/2011/04/bp_says_its_not_responsible_fo.html; Kirkham, supra note 19.
227. See supra text accompanying note 63.
228. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56423(A) (2006).
229. See, e.g., Press Release, Additional Freshwater Diversions, supra note 81.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
231. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:423(A), 56:427.1.
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according to any coastal restoration plan does not mean that they fall
outside of the scope of the hold-harmless clauses found in Louisiana
oyster leases.
Further, even if the oystermen are able to distinguish their cases from
the Avenal state decision, to the extent that the state court finds that the
hold-harmless clauses do not apply, the oystermen’s claims may still be
time-barred. The Avenal state decision remains good law in Louisiana
and the case clearly holds that claims for damage done to oyster beds due
to freshwater diversions have a two-year prescription period.232 Further,
the Avenal state decision provided that the prescription period began “to
run after the completion and acceptance of the public works,” which the
court determined was 1991.233 Under the court’s reasoning in the Avenal
state decision, the oystermen’s claims for damage done by the freshwater
diversions after the Spill may have been time-barred in 1993, seventeen
years before the oystermen sustained damage by the Spill.
In order to overcome the prescription clock of the Avenal state
decision, the oystermen would have to argue that the freshwater
diversions were so outside the scope of the freshwater diversion system’s
use under Louisiana’s coastal restoration plan, and that the prescription
period should not have begun to run until the oystermen sustained
damage after the Spill. Unfortunately, even if the court was persuaded to
reset the clock for the oystermen’s damages claims, their claims are most
likely still time-barred. The prescription period for damages claims in
Louisiana is two years, and the damage the oystermen sustained from the
freshwater diversions occurred in 2010, more than two years ago.234
Thus, the prescription period serves as a giant roadblock for oystermen’s
claims in Louisiana state courts.
B. Federal Claims
At first glance, the oystermen may have an easier case to make in
federal court. In the Avenal federal decision, the Court of Federal Claims
stated in dictum that the hold-harmless clauses in the oyster leases did
not change the fact that the state and federal governments had restrained
the plaintiffs’ use of their property.235 Although the court only stated this
in dictum, it is still evidence that a federal court would not consider the
hold-harmless clauses to be a bar to the oystermen’s takings claims.
232.
233.
234.
235.
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In addition, the oystermen’s claims may not be time-barred in federal
court. Under the Tucker Act, claimants should file takings claims
against the government in the Court of Federal Claims.236 The statute of
limitations for these claims is six years and, in a recent decision,
Northwest Louisiana Fish & Game Preserve Commission v. United
States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated
that a takings claim begins to accrue when the claimant actually suffers
damage.237 In that case, the court reasoned a takings claim accrues when
the events that allegedly set the government’s liability have occurred and
the claimant knew or should have known of the existence of the
events.238 Thus, a takings claim does not accrue while there is the threat
of future harm, and the possibility that there may be a future taking does
not support a present takings claim.239
The facts in Northwest Louisiana Fish are similar to the facts
supporting the oystermen’s potential claims in response to the freshwater
diversions after the Spill. In Northwest Louisiana Fish, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the claimant’s takings claim
did not accrue when the Corps took action that threatened harm in the
future, but accrued only when the harm to the claimant actually
occurred.240 Like the claimant in Northwest Louisiana Fish, the
oystermen could similarly argue that though the diversion systems
became operational in the early 1990s, the diversion systems at that
moment only threatened future harm to the oystermen. Thus, the
oystermen could argue their takings claims did not accrue until they
actually sustained harm, which was when their oysters sustained damage
due to the freshwater diversions after the Spill.
Similarly, another recent decision of the Court of Federal Claims
would support the oystermen’s argument that their claims are not timebarred. In George Family Trust v. United States, the court held that the
claimant’s takings claim had not accrued because the flooding of the
claimant’s property was not foreseeable until the Corps “unpredictably
changed” the flooding patterns, “thereby impacting what previously had
been a viable agricultural enterprise despite historical flooding.”241
Unlike George Family Trust, the oystermen could argue that their
takings claims did not accrue when the Corps began operating their
236. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).
237. Nw. La. Fish & Game Preserve Comm’n v. United States, 446 F.3d 1285, 1291
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1291-92.
240. Id. at 1291.
241. George Family Trust v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 177, 201 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
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diversion systems. Instead, the oystermen could contend that they had
been viably raising oysters while the Corps had been operating these
diversion systems since the early 1990s, and that their claims began to
accrue only when the government changed their usual freshwater
diversion patterns after the Spill and operated the diversion systems at
full capacity, which damaged their property. Under these previous cases,
the oystermen would have until sometime in 2016 to file their federal
claims, depending on when they actually sustained damage from the
freshwater diversions after the Spill.242
The U.S. Supreme Court has also decided cases after the federal
Avenal decision that could aid the oystermen’s claims. Although not
directly on point, the oystermen could state that by analogy, their case is
similar to when the government takes property by temporarily flooding
land. The Court recently decided Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v.
United States, a temporary takings case that involved the flooding of a
wildlife management area by the Corps where the Court held that
flooding should not be treated differently than other takings claims.243
The case involved release rates that were temporary deviations from the
regular operation plan of the dam.244 These deviations caused flooding
that led to damage to the timber in the wildlife management area, while
the normal release rates had not caused similar damage in the past.245
Despite the fact that in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission the
temporary deviations flooded land,246 while the freshwater diversions
after the Spill damaged submerged oysters,247 the facts of the two cases
are very similar. Like in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the
normal freshwater diversions rates of the coastal restoration plan allowed
the oystermen to successfully raise oysters; however, when the
deviations from the usual diversion rates occurred during the Spill, their
property sustained damage.248
In ruling that temporary flooding could be a taking, the Court
overturned the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which ruled that the temporary deviations from the dam’s
operating plan that had flooded the claimant’s property could not amount
to a taking, because in order to establish a takings claim for intermittent
flooding, a claimant must show that the flooding is “inevitably
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 190.
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 522 (2012).
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recurring.”249 The Court disagreed with this analysis, stating that
flooding should not be treated differently than other types of takings.250
Rather, the Court reiterated that such claims should be decided on a caseby-case basis and remanded the case to be decided using the Penn
Central Test.251
The Court specified some factors that the lower court could take into
account in deciding whether a taking had occurred, such as “the degree
to which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of
authorized government action . . . the character of the land at issue and
the owner’s ‘reasonable investment-backed expectations . . . as well as
the severity of the interference.’”252 Particularly, the Court pointed out
that though the damaged area was in a floodplain and had experienced
past flooding, the area “had not been exposed to flooding comparable to
the 1990’s accumulations in any other time span prior to or after the
construction of the Dam.”253
Although Arkansas Game & Fish Commission involves flooding and
damage on land, while the oystermen here sustained damage to
oysterbeds on submerged land, the oystermen have a comparable
situation because the diversions after the Spill were abnormal and not
part of the overall coastal restoration plan of Louisiana.254 However, it is
not clear how persuasive a court will find Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission since the Court did not do a takings analysis in the decision
and only ruled that a taking could have occurred.255 In deciding whether
to bring a similar claim as Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the
oystermen may want to follow how the lower federal court evaluates the
Commission’s temporary takings claim. If the decision turns out
favorably and the court finds that a temporary taking occurred, the
oystermen may want to make a similar temporary takings argument in
their claims.
The oystermen could also potentially use Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission to combat some of the reasoning of the federal Avenal
decision that discussed the foreseeability of the oystermen’s claims.256
The court in the federal Avenal decision stated that since the plaintiffs
were taking advantage of an area that was previously unsuitable for
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. at 523.
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oyster cultivation, they could not expect that the government would not
tamper with salinity levels in the future.257 The oystermen here could
argue that the freshwater diversions after the Spill were not foreseeable,
as they were much greater than any previous diversions in the history of
the diversion system.258 As stated above, the Court pointed out in
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission that though the damaged area was
in a floodplain and had experienced past flooding, the area “had not been
exposed to flooding comparable to the 1990’s accumulations in any other
time span prior to or after the construction of the Dam.”259 The
oystermen could claim that a gradual change in salinity brought on by an
incremental change in the amount of freshwater being released from the
diversion projects would be foreseeable; this type of change could be
planned for and the oystermen could take the appropriate steps to move
their leases. On the other hand, the sudden, large changes in the amount
of freshwater released after the Spill that had an immediate effect on
salinity and oyster health were not foreseeable.260 Thus, the claimant
could argue, foreseeability should not serve as a bar to their claims.261
Another U.S. Supreme Court case decided after the federal Avenal
decision may also be of use to the oystermen. In Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, the Court considered the takings claim of a property owner who
obtained title to the property in question after the government had passed
a regulation restricting the use of the property.262 In 1978, the Rhode
Island Coastal Resources Management Council (Council) passed
regulations that designated salt marshes as protected wetlands, greatly
restricting the amount of development that could occur on the
property.263 In 1978, the corporation who held the property lost its
corporate charter and the title to the property passed to Palazzolo, the
corporation’s sole shareholder, who subsequently made several
applications to the Council to develop the property.264 The Council
rejected these applications, believing that the development would violate
the salt marsh regulations, which prompted Palazzolo to file a takings
claim.265 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that since the salt marsh
regulations existed before Palazzolo obtained title to the property, he
257.
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could not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation to develop
his property under the Penn Central Test.266
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the reasoning of the Rhode
Island court and held that the fact that Palazzolo obtained title to the
property after the Council enacted the salt marsh regulations could not
serve as a bar to his takings claim.267 The Court reasoned that
governments should not be able to put an expiration date on takings
claims by barring claims by property owners who obtained title to
property after a regulation was enacted, and doing so, the Court stated,
would absolve the government from the obligation of defending its
actions, “no matter how extreme or unreasonable.”268 In doing so, the
Court rejected the lower court’s ruling stating that “[a] purchaser or a
successive title holder like the petitioner is deemed to have notice of an
earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a
taking.”269 The Court remanded the case to be determined under the
Penn Central factors.270
The oystermen here could use Palazzolo to combat the reasoning of
the federal Avenal decision where the court determined that the
oystermen could not have reasonable investment-backed expectations,
because they could not establish that they held their oyster leases prior to
when the government began planning the freshwater diversion projects,
and therefore, could not expect protection from the projects’ planned
freshwater diversions. The oystermen could argue that under Palazzolo,
this fact should not serve as an outright ban on their claims, but rather,
should only be one factor weighed in the Penn Central analysis.
Even if a court finds both Arkansas Game & Fish Commission and
Palazzolo to be persuasive and the oystermen here have been able to
distinguish their claims from the previous federal Avenal decision, the
oystermen will still have to contend with the fact that the federal Avenal
decision remains good law. Recently, the Court of Federal Claims
decided a case in which the claimant brought a takings claim based on
the Corps’ discharge of polluted freshwater from a lake into a river in
Florida.271 In that case, the Court of Federal Claims cited the federal
Avenal decision in finding that the claimants did not have a right to bring
a takings claim based on the discharge of freshwater into the river, which
266.
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altered the river’s salinity level.272 Even though, in Avenal, the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs did not have reasonable
investment-backed expectations and that not all takings claims based on
changed salinity levels would fail, the oystermen could face a similar
interpretation of the Avenal decision by the Court of Federal Claims in its
review of the oystermen’s claims.
Finally, oystermen should consider how a federal court might
examine the oystermen’s claims under the Penn Central Test. As stated
above, the oystermen here have a stronger case that these diversions were
unforeseeable than the Avenal plaintiffs did, since the diversions after the
Spill were not part of the normal operation of the diversion systems.
Further, the oystermen could use Palazzolo to argue that the fact that
they obtained their leases after the diversion systems were being planned
or operated should not serve as a bar to their claims. Moreover, if an
oysterman could show that his or her lease dated back to before the
planning of the diversion, which the Avenal plaintiffs were unable to do,
he or she would have an even stronger case that he or she had a
reasonable investment-backed expectation.
How a court might weigh the facts of the oystermen’s claims under
the Penn Central Test is uncertain, however, as there is no set formula
for examining takings cases. Because of this, it is often hard to predict
how a court will decide a takings claim. In addition to the foreseeability
and investment-backed expectations arguments discussed above, the
court may be swayed by the circumstances surrounding the Spill. In
light of the fact that the Spill is an emotional event, one cannot
underestimate how the facts of the Spill and the ecological damage that
the Spill caused might sway a court, and any potential claimants should
consider this factor in deciding whether to bring a takings claim. On the
other hand, the government stated that the freshwater diversions after the
Spill were taken to protect the coastal resources of Louisiana.273 Given
the chaos that occurred after the Spill, a court may find that the
government’s actions here were properly within the government’s police
power and duty under the public trust doctrine, and that the actions did
not go “too far.” In deciding whether to bring a takings claim, a potential
claimant should not fail to consider the unpredictability of how a court
may view a takings claim.

272. Id. at 245.
273. See PROJECT SUMMARY DAVIS POND DIVERSION, supra note 21.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, outside of the BP settlement process, the oystermen
who suffered damage from the freshwater diversions initiated after the
Spill may be able to bring takings claims in state and federal court,
though a state claim is likely to be time-barred. The previous Avenal
decisions will be a high hurdle for these claimants to overcome, and each
claimant will have to determine whether he or she is willing to expend
the time and resources, both financial and emotional, that a court case
will entail.
The oystermen will have to distinguish the facts of their case to
overcome the prior state decision’s holding that the Avenal plaintiffs’
claims were both time-barred and barred by the hold-harmless clauses in
Louisiana oyster leases. Even if the oystermen are able to successfully
argue that the diversions were outside the state’s coastal restoration plan,
the claims are most likely still time-barred. Claims for damages in
Louisiana have a two-year prescription period, and the damage to oysters
by the freshwater diversions occurred more than two years ago.
Although a federal claim may not be time-barred or barred by the
hold-harmless clause, the oystermen would still have barriers to
overcome in federal court. Any potential claimants will have to argue
that their case is distinguishable from the previous federal Avenal
decision, and the Federal Claims Court recently cited the federal Avenal
decision for the proposition that a claimant could not establish a takings
claim based on changed salinity levels.274 Though the oystermen may be
able to distinguish their cases from the facts of the Avenal decisions and
more recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions may help aid their arguments,
whether they will be able to overcome the precedent of these decisions is
not certain. Nor is one able to easily predict how a court would weigh
the facts of this case under the Penn Central Test.
In determining whether to bring takings claims, each oysterman will
have to determine whether the chance that they will be able to distinguish
their case from the Avenal decisions is worth the time, money, and
emotional resources that litigation entails. Oystermen should not
underestimate the time and resources that the claimants in the Exxon
Valdez litigation had to invest in their own court cases, and even the
Avenal decisions took many years to be decided. The oystermen should
consider whether they are willing to be invested in litigation for this
lengthy period of time and whether they are willing to risk that a court

274. See Mildenberger, 91 Fed. Cl. at 245.
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will not view their claims more favorably than the courts in the Avenal
decisions.

